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ARE CHARGES AGAINST THE MORAL CHARACTER OF
A CANDIDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE OFFICE CON-
DITIONALLY PRIVILEGED ?*
II.
S candidacy for an elective office such a special occasion as to
confer conditional privilege (prima facie protection) upon
charges affecting the moral character of the candidate?
No, according to the numerical weight of American decisions.
Yes, upon principle.
8 2
Notice that our question is, whether conditional or qualified privi-
lege attaches to charges against the moral character of the candidate.
Is there, in such case, defeasible immunity?
. At an earlier day it seenis to have sometimes been supposed that
there is no middle ground between absolute immunity and absolute
liability. The defendant sometimes seems to have been understood
as contending that absolute immunity attached to the making of any
charges whatsoever againist a candidate; irrespective of good faith,
right motive, or honest belief on the part of the defendant.
8
But no such unlimited claim is set up by defendants today. They
claim only that the fact of candidacy may give rise to a qualified
*Continued from the November number.
3 Under this topic we do not propose to discuss the question whether statements im-
puting intellectual or physical deficiencies to a candidate can be regarded as prima facie
actionable; or whether, if prima facie actionable, they are entitled to conditional- privilege.
For conflicting views, see Mayrant v. Richardson, x8,8, Nott & McCord, (South
Car-lina,) 347; Spiedirg v. Andras, 1878, 45 Wise. 330; Prof. Chase, 23 Am. Law Rev.
355-356; Folkard on Slander and Libel, 7th ed. 27-8a. See also Bill v. Neal, x66i, i
Levinz, 52; and HoLT, C. J. in How v. Prim:, xjo2, 7 Mod. 1o7, x12.
As to a distinction between the case of the holder of an office which is solely one
of honor or credit, and the holder of an office which involves a right to temporal profit;
see Bower, Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation, pp. 27-31, especially p. 3, note
tn.; and'also Odgers on Libel and Slander, 5th ed., p. s5-56.
22 "It seems to be supposed that the situation of a candidate for parliament is such
as to make it lawful for any man to say anything of- him." It is a strange idea that any
person may accuse him of any imaginable crime with impunity. The present defense
is not sustainable, "unless the proposition can be maintained that it is lawful to say
anything of a candidate."
S1 3. MANssiELu, C. J. in Harwood v. Astley, 1804, 1 Bos. & Pull. New, 47, P. 53.
"The doctrine contended for by the defendant's counsel, results in the position that
every publication, ushered forth under the sanction of a public political meeting, against
a candidate for an elective office, is beyond the reach of legal inquiry. To such a propo-
sition I can never yield my assent. * * * It would, in my judgment, be a monstrous
doctrine to eitablish. that when a man becomes a candidate for an elective office, he
ther y .gives to others a right to accuse him of any imaginable crime, with impunity."
THoMPsoN, J., in Letis v. Few, x8o9, S Johnson, N. Y., x, p. 36.
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privilege; a pritn facie protection which will be defeated if plaintiff
proves certain facts."4
Notice, too, that the law does not assume that the application of
the doctrine of conditional privilege will never cause hardship to a
plaintiff. On the contrary, it is admitted that such hardship must
occasionally occur; but it is believed that in the great majority of
instances -the application of this doctrine will result in benefit to the
public or its members, far outweighing the occasional hardship to
individual plaintiffs.
What are the principal arguments for, and the principal objec-
tions against, allowing conditional privilege in regard to charges
against the .moral character of a candidate for an elective office?
The fullest argument in favor of allowing the privilege is found
in the able and elaborate essay of Prof. George Chase, 23 Am. Law
Rev. 346. "Criticism of Public Officers and Candidates for Office."
This was published in 1889; and of course does not refer to decisions
later than that date. The opposite view is taken in an able essay
by Judge Veeder, in 23 Harv. Law Rev. 413, published in igio.
"Freedom of Public Discussion"
5
Those who would allow conditional privilege, contend that the
principle which is generally recognized as determiping the exist-
ence of conditional privilege in regard. to charges against private
individuals should be applied, mutatis mutandis, to charges against
candidates for elective public office.
That generally recognized principle as to charges against private
individuals is as follows:
"A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in
which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to
which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a cor-
responding interest or duty, although it contains criminatory matter
which, without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable *
** Duty * * * cannot be confined to legal duties which may be en-
""I will add that I do not think that should your Lordships agree with me 
we
should thereby be giving any unlimited license to slander during an election. 
We do
not lay it down that anybody is entitled to say anything against a candidate. 
Our de-
cision is merely that the occasion of speaking being what it was, and the thing 
said
what it was, there is no presumption in law that there was malice." RoSBxTSON, 
Loan
PRESIDENT. in Bruce v. Leisk, x892, xg Scotch Session Cases, 4th Series, 482, p.- 48S.
38 See especially 46-4i9, and 432. But compare p. 430.
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forcea Dy snUxhUnent, action, or mandamus, but must include moral
and social duties of imperfect obligation.""5
in the application of the above principle to charges against a
private person, it is common to regard as a typical case the instante
of information given to a' private master as to the character of one
applying for engagement as a private servant. It is contended that
the analogy -of this case of the would-be servant of a private master
applies to the case of applicants for public service in an elective
office.37
What are the objections urged against allowing conditional privi-
lege in such cases?
Objection I. In all these cases it is admitted that the publication
is "false." It is alleged that this falsity is in itself a sufficient reason
for denying conditional privilege.
"False" has two very different meanings; first, conscious false-
hood, a statement known to be untrue (or not believed to be true) by
the utterer; second, not true in point of fact, but honestly believed to
be true; an honest mistake on the part of the utterer. Undoubtedly
a statement false in the first sense is not conditionally privileged.
But a statement false in the second sense is a very different matter.
The circumstance that a charge is not true in point of fact does not
of itself preclude an honest utterer from availing himself of the
defense of conditional privilege. It does not defeat the plea of con-
ditional privilege. Indeed, the plea of conditional privilege invari-
ably assumes that the charge, though honestly made, was not true
in point of fact. (See ante, page I, note 2.) If want of truth in
point of fact excludes the defence of conditional privilege, then that
3dLoam CAxPBzt,, C. J. in Harrison v. Bush, 1855, 5 Ell. & BI. 344, P. 348-9; Od-
gers, Libel and Slander, 5th ed. 250. 252. Bower, Code of the Law of Actionable De-
famation, 124, and note z. 1z6, note d.
31 "As respects publications concerning candidates for office, we take upon ourselves.
with due deference to the decisions, to say, that the same rules apply to them as to com-
munications made concerning candidates for employment generally (s. 245) * The
rule, as we suppose, must be the same for every kind of employment, and office is only
another name for employment. The right which one has to speak concerning a candidate
for employment as a mechanic or domestic, is neither more extensive nor more limited
than the right one has to speak of a candidate for the office of a legislator or a judge."
Townshend on Slander and Libel, 4th ed., S. 247.
"If information given in good faith to a private individual of the misconduct of his
servant is 'privileged.' equally so must be a communication to the voters of a nation
concerning the misconduct of those whom they -are taxed to support and whose contin-
uance in any gervice virtually depends on the national voice. To be effectual, the latter
communication must be made in such form as to reach the public." Paeiner v. Concord,
1868, 48 N. H. 211, p. 216.
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defence can never avail, and the title "conditional privilege" must
disappear from the law of defamation.
In a very large number of cases where the falsity of the statement
is given. as a reason for denying conditional privilege, the context
shows that "false" was used in the second sense; and hence a denial
of privilege on the ground of falsity was erroneous. The very
sweeping language of some opinions should be modified.3"
It may be suggested that the fact that a statement was "false"
affords conclusive evidence that it was made with express, malice.
But this would be correct oily in the case of conscious falsehood,
where defendant knew the statement to be untrue when he made
it. It would not be correct in the case where the statement, although
not true in point o, fact, was believed to be true when made; where
its utterance was due to mistake. "That the statement is now ad-
mitted or proved to be untrue is no evidence that it was made mali-
ciously." (Odgers, 5th ed. 346). Where the occasion is condi-
tidnally privileged, there is no presumption of defendant's want of
belief. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove defendant's want of
belief. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove defendant's non-
belief.89
Objection 2. Members of the public have no more right to attack
the private character of a candidate than that of a non-candidate.
One who makes such an attack is liable unless he succeeds in proving
the truth of his statement. It is not a case where he can avail him-
self of the defence of conditional p~ivilege.
This view is really based upon the assumption that the private
character of a candidate is not an element to be considered by voters
in passing upon his fitness to hold public office.
That this view, which is taken by many courts, rests upon such an
"In Belktsp v. Bal, 1890, 83 Mich. 383, p. Sgo, GRANT, 3. said: "Publications of
falsehood are never privileged. No public interest can be subserved by tjeir publicition
and circulation."
In Daukhiny v. Buhne, x9o8, 1S3 Cal. 757, P. 763, LOiAGNo, J. said: "The public
have an interest in knowing the truth about thosa who occupy or seek public office, but.
it has no interest in having falsehoods concerning them disseminated."
These statements, unless confined to conscious falsehoods, are inconsistent with the
general theory upon which the doctrine oi conditional privilege is based. That goes upon
the supposition that the public interest may be subserved, on special occasions, by pro-
tecting, under certain conditions, the publication of honest mistakes. The courts believe
that the affording' of such protection in some cases will make it more likel] that truth
will be made known in a larger number of cases.
- See Zenoure v. Delmege, 1, R. (x89i), Appeal Cases, 73.
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assumption, is apparent from the language of judicial opinions, and
also from the pointts actually decided as stated in the note below.
4 0
In the cases cited in the preceding notes, courts hold that condi-
tionAl privilege does not attach to charges against the private char-
"The court said that the character and reputation of the plaintiff, a candidate for
electign as police magistrate, "was as sacred, and as much entitled to protection, when z
-candidate for offce, as at any other" time." Rearick v. Wilcox, 1876, 8r Ill. 77, P. 8x.
"In our opinion, a person who enters 'upon a public office, or becomes a candidate
for one, no more surrenders to the public his private character, than he does his private
property." WmLzams, J., Post PubL. Co. v. Moloney, 1893, So Ohio St. 7x, p. 89; quoted
by ELLtsox, J. 1911, 154 Mo. App. 30S, P. 312-313.
Charges that a candidate has committed disgraceful acts, affecting his fitness for
office, are not cpiditionally privileged. Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 1893, 59 Fed.
Rep. 53o; S. C., 16 United States App. 6x3; 8 Circuit Court App. so:.
Charges of crime or imputations of moral delinquency against a candidate are not
conditionally privileged.- Sweeny v. Baker, 1878, 13 W. Va. 158.
Charge that a candidate for an elective municipal office is under indictment for
felony; held not conditionally privileged. Jones v Townsend's Admin., x885, 2x Fla. 431.
No privileged "occasion in the case of a candidate. Aldrich v. Press Printing Co.,
1864, 9 Minn- r33, see pp, 138-z39.
(Later Minnesota cases are contra.)
Charges against candidates arc not conditionally privileged. Starks v. Comer, 1914.
9o Ala. 24S.
Semble: majority of judges think that charges against a candidate are not condi-
tionally privileged. See-OvRTox, J., p. 101-102. CA'Pau.L, J., p. x6 seems contra.
Brewer v. Weakley, 18o7, a'Overton, (Tenn.) 99.
(This case is not referred to in the subsequent, Tennessee case in 16 Lea, 176.)
Charge of crime against candidate for Conress is nnt conditionally privileged. Bron-
son v. Bruce, z886, 59 Mich. 46k
That, while proper criticism of the conduct'or fitness of public officers and candi-
dates for. public office is privileged, the privilege does not extend to the imputation of
moral delinquency to such persons, and that he who atacks their private character and
attributes to them moral turpitude must stand prepared to prove the truth of his state-
ments under a plea of justification. * " Williams Printitg Co. v. Saunders, 1912, 1x3
Vs. r56, K,H, P., p. x8i.
Allegations of fact charging a candidate with a criminal offence are not conditionally
privileged. Star Publ. Co. v. Donohue, Delaware Supreme Court, 1904, S AtL 5x3;
affirming Superior Court, 1902-1903, 4 Penn. (Del.) 166.
Defamatory statements of specific acts of misconduct concerning a candidate for
office are not conditionally privileged. Paitangall v. Mooers, 1g5, iz3 Maine, 412.
Charging candidate for sheriff with p'tjury; not cokditionally privileged. Seely v.
Blair, 1833, Wright (Ohio), 358 Title, as to charges of forgery, Seely v. Blair, 1834,
Wright (Ohio), 683.
Publication in regard to candidate for punc office is not conditionally privileged.
The rule of Burt v. Advertiser Co., 189o, 154 Mass. 238, as to the discussion of the
con du t of a public man, is applied to thim case. Cum. v. Pratt, 1911, 2o8 Mass. 5s5-
559-56Z.
No conditional privilege to impute crime to a candidate, or to make allegations af-
fecting fiis character. Smith v. Burrus, z89z, to6 Mo. 94.
"Yet it is the law of this IState that to accuse a candidate for public office of an
offense is not privileged, though the charge was made without evil motive, and in the
exercise of a political right (Lewis v. Few, s Johns. x) and though the libel relates to
a public act of the candidate in his official place. (Id. Root v. King, x827, 7 Cowen,
613, affirmed on error brought, 1829. 4 Wend. 113)." FoLoEr, C. J., 8x New York,
zx6, p. 126. (Point decided was that the same rule applies to charges against an office
holder, even though not a candidate for reelection.) Hamilton v. Eno, x88o, 8z N. Y. xi6.
CHARGES AGAINST CANDIDATES
acter of a candidate for public office; even though -the charges, if
true, would affect his fitness for the office.
"1
The fallacy of the assumption that the private character of a
candidate is not an element to be considered by voters in passing
upon his fitness to hold public office, has been pointed out by eminent
legal essayists and judges.
"A candidate for an office of public trust, for instance, necessarily
puts his personal character in issue so far as it pertains to his qualifi-
cations for the office he seeks. While this view has not met with
universai acceptance, it seems clear that the fundamental- error of
any other doctrine consists in the assumption that the private .char-
acter of a public officer is something aside from, and not entering
into or influencing, his public conduct; that a thoroughly dishonest
person may be a just administrator, and that a judge who is corrupt
and debauched in other, relations of life may still be pure and upright
41 Some courts have gone further; and have held that conditional privilege does not
attach to charges of gross immorality and misbehavior in the conduct of a public office
by a public official, who is now a candidate for re-election to the same office. "
Charge against Lieutenant Governor, who is a candidate for re-election, tlft he.
was intoxicated when presiding in the Senate. Held, not conditionally privileged, Root
v. King, 2827, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 613; affirmed on error, 1829, 4 Wend. 113, p. 138.
In Dauplsiny v. Buhne, 1goS, xS3 Cal. 757, plaintiff a member .of common council
of city, was a candidate for reelection. Defendant published an article, charping plaintiff
with official corruption (voting by reason of bribe). Court charged jury that they might
find that publication was privileged; and, if so, no action would lie, unless malicious
Inotive. Verdict for defendant. Reversed. New trial. Charge held erroneous. The
only justification is truth. Honest belief of truth, not enough. Decision follows Jar-
man v. Rea, i9o2, 37 Cal. 339-
- judge:Veeder, in 23 Harv. Law Rev., p. 433, note 2, quotes the following passage
from the opinion of LbioAN, J., in Dauphiny v. Buhne, 153 Cal. p. 763: "It is true
that when a person beconei a candidate for a public office, his talents and qualificatione
for the office to which he aspires may be fully commented on and criticized by any
member of the community, by publication or otherwise. His faults and his vices, in so
far as they may affect his official character, may be freely discussed. He does not, 
fow-
ever, by becoming a candidate, surrender his private character as a subject for 
false
accusatio'n. That character is only put in issue as far as fi1nbss or qualification for 
the
office he seeks may be affected by it."
"And yet in this case," adds Judge Veeder, "the imputation was official corruption."
The learned writer also says: "The contradiction is as flat in Tanner v. Embree, 99 
Pac.
547 (California), and in Forke v. Homrn, 14 Tem. 
Civ. App. 67o, * * ."
Even if a court should hold that charges against the private character of a 
candi-
date arm not conditionally privileged, yet the law *can hardly fail to allow conditional
privilege to charges against the conduct of a public office by a public official, who 
is now
it candidate for reelection.
But we do not here dwell upon this last point. We are now concerned especially
with the question whether charges'against the private character of a candidate 
are en-
titled to conditional privilege.
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in his judgments; in other words, that an evil tree is as likely as
any other to bring forth good fruit."' 2
"Any such assumption is false to human nature, and contradic-
tory to general experience, and whatever the law may say, the gen-
eral public will still assume that a corrupt life will influence public
conduct, and that a man who deals dishonestly with his fellows as
individuals will not hesitate to defraud them in their aggregate and
corporate capacity, if the opportunity shall be given him. They are
therefore interested in knowing what is the character of their public
servants and what sort of persons are offering themselves for their
suffrages. "
In 23 Am. Law Review, 36o, Professor Chase, speaking of Com.
v. Wardwell, 1883, 136 Mass. 164, says: This opinion "is of special
value as showing approval of the view that the private character of
candidates may be assailed, if it affects their fitness for public office.
The same view has been asserted in ,ngland, as has been shown,
and there can be no doubt thiat it is a most salutary rule. The com-
mon statement that the public acts of public men may be criticized
is apt to-create the idea that their private character is wholly exempt
from discussion. There is no reasonable ground for such a doc-
trine * * *"
As to the statement of WiTLLms J., in 50 Ohio St. 71, p. 89;-
that a candidate "no more surrenders. to the public his private char-
acter than he does his private property ," It was said by BuRcu J.
in Coleman v. McLennan, 19o8, 78 Kan. 711, p. 739: "Manifestly
a candidate must surrender to public scrutiny and discussion so much
of his private character as affects his fitness for office, and the liberal
rule requires no more. But in measuring the extent of a candidate's
profert of character it should always be remembered that the people
have good authority for believing that grapes do not grow on thorns
nor figs on thistles."
Objection 3. The allowance of the defense of conditional privi-
lege, will have the effect of preventing suitable persons from becom-
ing candidates. This objection is stated thus, by CHAcnwi, WAT.-
4Judge Veeder, 23 Harv. Law Rev. 430.
This learned writer is among the jurists who deny that conditional privilege attaches
to charges against the moral character of a candidate for an elective office. But it should
be here specially noted that his denial is not based upon the ground stated under Objec-
tion 2. On the contrary, he utterly repudiates the reasoning upon which Objection 2
is attempted to be supported; and, instead, bases his denial of conditional privilege upon
the grounds taken under Objection 3 and Objection 4. See 23 Harv Law Rev., pp. 418,
4-9.
4S Cooley, Conat. Ir -, 7th ed. 626-7, Sth ed. 54-S3
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woRaH, in Root v. King, I829, 4 Wend., p. 138; "* * * no man, who
had any character to lose would be a candidate for office under such
a cbnstriction of the law of libel.""
We do not think that this result (prevention of suitable candi-
dates) would happen in a large majority of cases. In the compara-
tively rare instances where it does happen, the disadvantage is more
than counterbalanced by the advantage of obtaining information
about candidates in general, which is likely to result from allowing
the defence of conditional privilege (instead of holding that all
defendants speak at their peril and are liable for incorrect informa-
tion given bona fide and with reasonable ground for belief.).
Objection 4. The analogy of private master and servant, which
has often 'been urged as decisive in favor of allowing conditional
privilege as to charges against candidates for elective office, does not
apply.
The distinction is attempted to be made, that, in the case of a
candidate for a public office to be filled at a general election, the area
of defamation is wider, and hence the damage to an individual can-
didate is much greater, than in the case of an applicant for private
service.
45
This view is prominently put forward in the opinion of an eminent
judge, which has had great influence. It is the opinion of TAVr J.,
in Post Publ. Co. v. Hallacm, 1893, 59 Fed. Rep. 530; 8 C. C. A.
201, 2io. The entire opinion on this point is as follows: (PP. 539-
54o).
"Finally, we come to those assignments of error which are
based on the charge of the court in regard to privileged com-
munications. The court in effect told the jury that the article
in question, relating, as it did, to a matter of public interest,
came within a class of communications that were conditionally
'privileged; that the public acts of public men (and candi-
dates for office were public men) could be lawfully made the
subject of comment and criticisrfi, not only by the press, but
also by all members of the public, for the press haj no higher
rights than the individual; but that while criticism and com-
ment, however severe, if in good faith, were privileged, false
allegations of fact, as, for instance, that the candidate had
committed disgraceful acts, were not privileged, and that, if
See also Judge Veeder, 23 Harv. Law Rev. 419.
"This argument would not apply to a case where the office was to be filled by ap-
pointment, and the charge was addressed only to the appointing power.
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the charges were false, good faith and probable cause were no
defence, though they might mitigate damages. Counsel for
the plaintiff in error and the defendant below has argued with
great vigor and an array of authorities that we ought not to
adopt the view of the circuit court upon this important ques-
tion, but should hold that the privilege extends to statements
of facts as well as comment.
"The argument is this:. -Privileged communication. com-
prehend all bona fide statements in performance of any duty,
whether legal, moral, or social, even though of imperfect
obligation, when made with a fair and reasonable purpose of
protecting the interest of the person making them or the
interest of the person to whom they are made. Townsh.
Sland. & L., Section 2o9. It is of the deepest interest to the
public that they should know facts showing that a candidate
for office is unfit to be chosen. Therefore, every'one who has
reasonable ground for believing, and does believe, that such
a candidate has committed disgraceful acts affecting his fitness
for the office he seeks, should have the right to give the public
the bepefit of his information, without making himself liable
in damages for untrue statements, unless malice is shown.
Though of "mperfect obligation, it is said to be the highest
duty of the daily newspaper to keep the public informed of
facts concerning those who are seeking their suffrages and
confidence. Can it be possible, it is asked, that public policy
will make privileged an unfounded charge of dishonesty or
criminality against one seeking private service, when made
to the private individual with whom service is sought, and
yet will not extend the same protection to him who in good
faith informs the public of charges against applicants for
pervice with them? Is it not, at least, as important that the
high functions of public office should be well discharged, as
that those in private service should be faithful and honest?
"The a fortiori step in this reasoning is only apparent.. It
is not real. The existence and extent of privilege in communi-
cations are determined by balancing the needs and good of
society against the right of an individual to enjoy a good
reputation when he has done nothing which ought tq injure
it. The privilege should always cease where the sacrifice of
the individual right becomes so great that the public good to
be derived from it is outweighed. Where conditional privi-
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lege is extended to cover a statement of disgraceful fact to a
master concerning a servant or one applying for service, the
privilege covers a bona fide statement, on reasonable ground,
to the master only, and the injury done to the servant's repu-
tation is with the master only. This is the extent of the
sacrifice which the rule compels the servant to suffer in what
was thought to be, when the rule became a law, a most im-
portant interest of society. But, if the privilege is to extend
to cases like that at bar, then a man who offers himself as a
candidate must submit uncomplainingly to the loss of his
reputation, not with a single person or a small class of per-
sons, but with every member of the public, whenever an un-
true charge of disgraceful conduct is made against him, if
only his accuser honestly believes the charge upon reasonable
ground. We think that not only is such a sacrifice not re-
quired of every one who consents to become a candidate for
office, but that to sanction such a doctrine would do the'pub-
lic more harm than good.""1
Undoubtedly the area of defamation in the case of a candidate
for public office to be filled at a general election is much wider than
in the case of an applicant for employment by a private master.
But on the other hand, the importance to the public of obtaining
information about the applicant for public employment is much
greater. The election of an unfit person to a high' public office is
likely to work far more harm than the employment of an unfit serv-
ant by a private master. "Servants of private masters may have to
suffer from false charges made to protect their master's interests.
But the interest of the public in knowing the character of its serv-
ants is of infihitely higher importance."
4 7
Objection has been made to the allowance of conditional privi-
leges "because it would expose upright and innocent men to undue
license of abuse and misrepresentation, without redress. But this
danger is greatly guarded against by allowing only such charges to
be made as distinctly relate to unfitness for office, and by requiring
good faith in the accuser and probable grounds of belief."'
S
It is a mistake to say that a candidate "must submit uncomplain-
ingly to the loss of his reputation" "if only his accuser honestly be-
4See, to same effect, Judge Veeder, 23 Harvard Law Review 478-419. Compare
HOLMES, T., Burt v. Advertiser, etc., 189r, 154 Mass. "238, P. 243.
41 Prof. Chase, 23 Amer. Law Rev. 370.
"Prof. Chase, 23 Amer. Law Rev. 370.
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lieves the charge upon reasonable ground." The candidate can
bring suit and compel his accuser to admit that the charge is not
true in fact. The plea of conditional privilege is itself an admis-
sion of the untruth of the charge. If the defendant, upon a plea
of conditional privilege, prevails in the suit and recovers costs, he
does so, not upon the ground that the charge was true, but upon the
ground that there were special reasons for excusing a defendant
who had made a mistake.'
9
Suffering by inilocent individuals for the general good is not con-
fined to the case now under discussion. A private citizen may have
to endure, without redress, an unfounded charge of crime, made to
the public authorities and causing his arrest. He cannot, even after
acquittal, maintain an action against the accuser, unless he can make
out both of the following propositions: (I) that the charge was
made from wrong motives; (2) that the accuser did not have prob-
able cause fol believing him guilty.
0 But a defamed candidate
may,. in our view, recover for defamation if he can prove either
wrong motive Or want of probable cause.
In actions of defamation brought by candidafes, the defence of
conditional privilege has- sometimes been allowed to prevail where
the charge was published from right motives and with belief in its
truth, although the defendant did not have reasonable cause for his
belief.51
We are not inclined to go to that extent. For reasons stated in
an earlier part of this paper, we think that in all cases the defense
of conditional privilege should fail whenever the plaintiff proves the
want of reasonable cause.
52
And there are, especial reasons for applying this rule to charges
against candidates fQr office. Good motive and belief in the charge
are entitled to less weight in political contests than on many other
occasions. In such contests men of generally high character are
apt to reason less carefully and less accurately than upon ordinary
subjects. Horace Mann of the United States wrote to George
Combe of Great Britain: "Party allegiance here has very much the
effect of loyalty with you. It has the power to change the nature of
The court might well refuse to allow costs against the plaintiff in cases where de-
fendant, up to the time of filing the plea of conditional privilege, had persisted 
in assert-
ing the truth of the charge, and where the plaintiff, upon the filing of such plea by the
defendant had discontinued his action.05See 23 Am. Law Review, 7o.
81 See Bays v. Hunt, x88a,'6o Iowa, 25Z1.Prof. Chase, 23 Am. Law Rev. 366-7.
5 Prof. Chase prefers thi view to the Iowa doctrine.' 23 Am. L. Rev. 366-7, 370.
CHARGES AGAINST CANDIDATES
right and wrong." Life of Horace Mann, p. 346. And the Alabama
court has recently said 5 that "it may perhaps be asserted, as a mat-
ter of-common experience, that the great majority of the detractory
charges which are made or published against candidates during polit-
ical campaigns, are without substantial foundation in fact; * * V'54
The considerations just mentioned have induced some courts to
go to an extreme, opposite to the result reached in Iowa. Such courts
hold that the charges against the character of a candidate can never
be entitled to conditional privilege. The fact that these charges are
so frequently unfounded may justify courts in affixing very strin-
gent limitations and qualifications to the setting up the defense of
prima facie privilege. But we think it does not follow that the
courts are justified in uniformly refusing to allow that defense upon
any limitations or qualifications whatever.
On principle, we think that candidacy for an elective public office
is such a special occasion as will confer prima faie protection on
charges against the character of the candidate, which, if true, would
show him to be unfit for the office; this protection being subject to
be defeated if plaintiff proves, either (I) that the defendant was
actuated by wrong mQtive; or (2) that the defendant did not be-
lieve the charge to be true, or (3) that the defendant, although be-
lieving in the charge, had not reasonable cause for such belief.
If the general doctrine of conditional privilege is to be retained in
the law, then we think it applies here. An argument can" be made
against the general doctrine. But it is not likely to be cast out of
the law; and, upon the whole, we do not think it ought to be aban-
doned.5'5
OlSomRviLLE, J.' Starki v. Comer, X914, igo AL 245, P. 251.
"In one recent instance a judge seemed inclined to contemptuously dismiss a libel
suit, which was probably brought for the purpose of diminishing the i;fluence t the
plaintiff in behalf of candidates in a pending political campaign. In McCue v. Equity
&c. Pubi. Co., N. Dak., zgz8, z67 N. W. Rep. 225, p. 231, RoBrNsoN, 3., in a dissenting
opinion, said: "This is a petty libl suit, based on the publication of a rather harmless
looking political squib," alleged to be defamatory of a former Atorney General. "Its
manifest purpose was to forestall and curb the political activities of the EX-Attorney
General in working against" certain "Supreme Court Candidates."
In this case a majority of the court held that a demurrer to the complaint must be
oveiruled.
5As to decidel. cases: The tendency of courts to enlarge the sphere of privilege
is recobgmzed by Mt, Bower in the following passage: "From the history of the judicial
establishment of the several groups mentioned in the text as the subject of defeasible
immunity (see App. XIII), scarcely one of which has come within the protected area
except by degrees, or without 'encountering opposition from various quarters at every
-stage, it seems more than likely that, as social duties, interests and relations become more
numerous and complex, many other species of publications will, after similar contentions,
make good their title to be included in the sphere from which they have hitherto been
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
In a majority of the states where the question has been decided,
the decision is againit our view.
In the following jurisdictions it is practically held, that condi-
tional privilege does not attach to charges against the moral char-
acter of a candidate for an elective office:
U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals: Post Publ. Co. v. Hallam, 1893
59 Fed. 53o, S. C. 16 U. S. App. 613; 8 Circuit Court App. 2o.
Alabama: Starks v. Comer, 1914, 190 Ala. 245.
California: arnan v. Rea,- 19o2, 137 Cal. 339; Dauphiny v.
Buhne, 1908, 153 Cal. 57-
Delaware: Star Publ. Co. v. Donahoe, Supreme Court, 19o4, 58
Ati. 513, affirming decision of Superior Court, 19o2-i9o3, 1904, 4
Penn. (Del.) 166.
Florida: Jones v. Townsend's Admr. 1885, 21 Fla. 43!.
Illinois: Rearick v. Wilcox, 1876, 81 Ill. 77.
Maine: Pattangall v. Mooers, 1915, 113 Maine 412.,
Massachusetts: Com. v. Pratt, 1911, 208 Mass. 553, 559f66;
(applying to this case the rule of Burt v. Advertiser & Co. 189I 154
Mass. 238, as to the-discussion of the conduct of a public man.)
Michigan: Bronson v. Bruce, 1886, 59 Mich. 467.
Missouri:- Smith v. Burrus, 189I, io6 Mo. 94.
New York: Lewis v. Few, S Johns. x; Root v. King, 1827, 7
Cow. 613; affirmed 1829, 4 Wend. 113, p. 138. And see FOLG41
C. J. ii Hamilton v. Eno, i88o, 81 N. Y. i16, p. 126.
Ohio: Seely v. Blair, 1833, Wright (Ohio) 358; Seely v. Blair,
1833, Wright (Ohio) 683; and .see WUiLrIs, J., Post Publ. Co. v.
Moloney, 1893, 50 Ohio St. 71, P. 89.
Tenfiessee: Semble majority of court in Brewer v. Wedkley,
1807, 2 Overton, 99; pp.1ioi, io2.
Virginia: Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 1912, 113 Va. 
156,
pp. 181-183; Carpenter v. Meredith, 1918, 96 S. E. Rep. 635.
West Virginia: Sweeny v. Baker, 1878, 13 W. Va. 158.
As to Wisconsin, see OwZN, J.. in Walters v. Sentinel Co., 1918,
169 N. W. Rep. 564, p. 566.
excluded. This branch of the law of defamation is, like 
the law merchant, in a constant
state of flux, or rather development. It is not a rigid 
and inelastic body of rules, fixed
for all time, but, in virtue of the main principle (stated 
in Article 34) to which, in the
last resort, all particular cases must be referred, it contains 
within itself the potency and
promise of expansion proportionate to the growth of social 
requirements and tendencies.
This was clearly recognized by three successive chief justices 
of England, Loan C^esRsLL,
Sit ALszEXou CocMsIUar, dand LoaD CoLzxaxn,-in i858, x&68, and 1878, 
respectively,
and again by the C. A. in z889."
Bower, Code, 145, note c.
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In the following states, it is practically held by the courts
6 that
conditional privilege attaches to charges against the character of a
candidate for an elective office. As to each decision, we have noted
whether reasonable cause of belief is added as a requisite to de-
fence.57
Iowa: Mott v. Dawson, I877, 46 Iowa, 533. Instruction names
reasonable cause as a requisite. In Bays v. Hunt, 1882, 6o Iowa
251, it was held that a reasonable cause is not a requisite. Children
v. Shinn, 1915,16g Iowa, 531, 548; reasonable cause not a requisite.
Kansas: State v. Balch, I884, 31 Kan., 465. Reasonable cause
not stated as a requisite. Coleman v. MacLennan, 19o8, 78 Kan. 711.
Instruction named reasonable cause as a requisite; but decision does
not seem based on this. Good v. Higgins, 1916, 99 Kan. 315, P. 320.
Reasonable cause stated as a requisite.
Minnesota: Marks v. Baker, i88r, 28 Minn. 162; (practically
overruling Aldrich v. Press Printing Co., 1864, 9 Minn. 153. See
State v. Ford, 19Ol, 82 Minn. 452. Reasonable cause not stated as
a requisite in 28 Minn. 162 or in 82 Minn. 452. But see 83 Minn.
441, P- 445-
Nebraska: Any conflict in the earlier cases (see Mertens v. Bee
Publ. Co., May, 1904, 5 Neb. Unofficial, 592; Farley -v. McBride,
"In an earlier part of this paper we have cited statutes which make reasonable
ground for belief a protiction in certain cases. See English Statute of 58 and 59 Vict.,
Chap. 40, Section ., as to false statements of fact in relation to the personal character
or conduct of a parliamentary candidate; also provisions in the criminal codes of New
York, Minnesota, and Washington: 4 Consolidated Laws of New York, Ed. x9og, Chap.
40, Article z.6, Section 1342. Revised Laws of Minnesota, Ed. 19o5, Part- IV, Chap.
97, Section 4917. Annotated Codes of Washington, Ed. 191o, Title XIV, Chap. V, Sec-
tion 2425.
VrThere are some judicial opinions for or against the allowance of conditional priv-
ilege in candidate cases which do not distinctly advert to the effect of the presence or
absence of reasonable cause for belief. There are cases which hold that conditional
privilege does not attach even when there is reasonable cause for belief. See, for
instance, Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, 1893, 59 Fed. Rep. 53o. Again, there are cases
which hold that reaonable cause is an essential requisite to protection. See, for instance,
the Pennsylvania cases cited in this paper. But there are also cases which do not show
whether there was or was not reasonable cause. And sometimes there is a decision in
favor 'of the defendant, where no stress' is laid on the fact that reasonable cause is found
to exist. That fact is not made the basis of a decision which favors the defendant. A
strong instance of this is found in Coleman v. MacLennan, t9o8, 78 Kan. 7zL. There
the trial judge, in charging the jury, first stated, in an abstract form, requisites to the
action. Here he did not enumerate the want of reasonable cause of belief. Next hc
stated the law in a concrete form to be applied to this case. Here he stated the existence
of reasonable cause as a defense. The judge delivering the opinion of the Law Court,
in recapitulating the essential poiuts, omitted this part of the charge; and the reporter
did not include it in his head notes. It would seem that the decision of the Law Court,
in favor of the defendant, did not turn upon the presence of reasonable cause, which
must be taken to liave been found by the jury.
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i9o5, 74 Neb. 49) would seem to be disposed of in Estelle v. Daily
News Publ. Co. (Feb. i916) 99 Neb. 397. While the judges were
not unanimous as to the disposition to be made of that particular
case, the majority adopted the view that conditional privilege at-
taches to charges respecting the quality and fitness of a candidate
for elective office. Reasonable cause of belief is stated as a requi-
site to protection, -though the burden may be on the defendant to
prove its existence. See head note 4 on p. 398, and Swowicic J. p."
407. This view of the majority in 99 Neb., 397, is affirmed in same
case. Oct. 2, i917, 1oI Neb. 61o.
New Jersey: State v. Fish, Court of Errors, Nov. i917, 9i New
Jersey Law 228; reversing Supreme Court decision of March, 1917,
reported in 90 N. J. Law, 17. Reasonable cause not stated as a
requisite. Honest belief in truth said to be sufficient. In Finkel-
stein v. Geismar, 9i N. J. Law, 46 p. 48, reasonable belief is men-
tioned as a requisite.
North Carolina" Byrd v. Hudson, 1893, 113 N. C. 203. Instruc-
tions fully sustain doctrine that conditional privilege attaches to
charges against candidates. Under these instructions a verdict was
rendered for plaintiff. Hence plaintiff could not carry up an ex-
ception to the charge. Reasonable cause was stated as a requisite.
See also io9 N. Car., 270, p. 274-
Pennsylvania: Briggs v. Garrett, i886, iii Pa. St. 404; Coates
v. Wallace, 1897, 4 Pa. Superior Court, 253. In both cases reason-
able belief is stated as a requisite.
South Dakota: In this state it has been held in several cases, the
earliest of which was decided in igoo, that conditional privilege
attaches to charges against candidates for elective office; the privi-
lege being subject to be defeated if plaintiff proves express malice
or want of probable cause. Burcher v. Clark Pubi. Co. 19oo, 14 S.
Dak.,. 72, pp. 82, 83; Myers v. Longstaff, 1900, 14 S. Dak., 98, pp.
io8, iio; Ross v. Ward, 1901, 14 S. Dak., 240, p. 248, Schull v.
Hopkins, 191o, 26 S. Dak., 21, p. 27. In a later case, Egan v. Dot-
son, 1915, 36 S. Dak., 459, the court reaffirms the ab6ve decisions
as "the settled law of this State." But they say that this result is
based on special provisions in the constitution and statutes of South
Dakota; and that, in the absence of such special provisions, it would
be'held that'conditional privilege does not attach in such cases. The
courts refer specially to Constitution, Art. 6; Sect. 5; Civil Code, s.
29: "Libel is a false and unprivileged publication * * *"; and Civil
Code, Sect. 31, Subdivision 3: "A privileged publication is made:
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* * * 3. In a cpmmuication without malice, to a person interested
therein, * * *"
As to Rew Hampshire:
The opinions given in two New Hampshire cases, taken together,
strongly indicate that this court would hold that conditional privi-
lege attaches to charges against the character, of a candidate for
elective office. But this precise point was not raised in either of the
cases.
Palmer v. Concord, i868, 48 N. H. 211, was an action by a news-
paper proprietor against a city, under a statute making a city liable
for property dstroyed by a mob. The statute provided that no
person shall be entitled to the benefits of this act, if it shall appear
that the destruction of his property was caused by his "illegal or im-
proper conduct." The newspaper had published on August 3, 186i,
articles making charges as to cowardly and brutal conduct of U. S.
volunteers in the Civil War. The city contended that this pub-
lication, which caused the mob, was libellous and hence "illegal."
The trial judge instructed the jury that the articles were not libel-
lous. The jury having disagreed, the case was reserved for the
Law Term, in order to determine questions of law raised at the tal.-
and which would arise at another trial. The Law Court held ki
substance) that some of the articles were prima facie libellous: but
that their publication was not illegal if the publisher, believing upon
reasonable grounds, that the facts alleged were true, published them
in good faith for the purpose of inducing a reform. See opinion
p. 216-217.
Carpenter v. Bailey, 1873, 53 N., H. 59o, was an action of libel,
brought by a paymaster in the U. S. Navy, against individuals who
had sent to the New Hampshire Congressional Delegation charges
in regard to his conduct and asking for his removal from his station
at Portsmouth, N. H. SARGEriT, C. J., said (p. 595) that "the oc-
casion would be a lawful one, provided, the motive was good, and
there Was probable cause." Defendant had pleaded that he had been
informed and believed that the facts stated were true. Upon de-
murrer, the plea was held bad; this allegation not being equivalent
to an allegation that the defendant had probable cause to believe.
As to Scotch law: A charge respecting a candidate for a muni-
cipal office was held conditionally privileged. The plaintiff not de-
siring to add an averment of "malice," the action was dismissed.
Reasonable cause was not stated as a requisite. KINznAR, ., says,
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in substance, that want of reasonable cause would have been evi-
dence for the jury upon an issue of malice, if the plaintiff had
averred "inalice." Bruce v. Leisk, 1892, Vol. 19 Scotch Session
Cases, 4th Series, 482; Reported by Rettie et als.
English authority, as to whether conditional privilege attaches
to charges against the private character of a candidate for an elec-
tive office:
In various early cases sometimes cited in the discussion of this
topic, the above question did not arise. The question raised was
whether certain charges against candidates for parliament were
actionable (not whether conditional privilege could be set up as a
defense to the publication of charges which were pria.facie action-
able). Such was the question raised by motion in arrest of judg-
ment on the ground that "the words are not accountable,"'in Clarges
v. Rowe, 33 Car. 2, 3 Levinz, 31, affirmed on error, 34 and, 35 Car.
2, Sir. T. Raymond, 482, also in How v. Prin, i Anne, 7 Modem,
io7; S. C., 2 Salkeld 694; 2 Lord Raymond, 812; Holt, 652; affirmed
by majority in House of Lords; see 2 Lord Raymond, p. 813. See
also Walmsley v. Russell, 3 Anne, 2 Salkeld 696."s
In Harwood v. Astley, I8O4, i Bos. & Pull. New Rep. 47, the point
decided was that words (in this case a charge of murder) which
would be actionable of themselves if spoken of a. private person,
'are not the less so, because they are alleged to have been spoken
of one as a candidate to serve in parliament." The case is an auth-
ority for the position that charges against a candidate for parlia-
ment are not entitled to absolute privilege. -There is nothing in the
opinion to show that conditional .privilege would not attach to -such
charges.
As to later cases, having a more direct bearing on the question of
conditional privilege:
Duncombe v. Daniell, 1837, 8 Car. & Payne, 222, was an- action for
the. publication, in a London newspaper, of charges against the
private Uharacter of a candidate for Parliament. Defendant pleaded
not guilty, and several pleas of justification. Upon trial by jury,
LoRD DENMAN, C. J., in summing up said: "It appears to me that
the occasion did not justify the present publication; and I think also
that the pleas of justification are not proved." There was a verdict
for plaintiff. In the ensuing term, Sir W. W. Follett, upon a motion
.A similar question was raised in Ons.low v. Horne, 1771. 3 Wilon. 177, where
certain words spoken of a member of parliament, were beld not actionable.
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for a new trial, pp. 228-229, contended (inter alia) "that it was jus-
fifiable for an elector bona fide to communicate to the constituency
any matter respecting a candidate which he believed to be true, and
believed to be material to the election." iCoLERmG4, J. "You must
go further than that, and make out that the elector, is entitled to
publish it to all the world. This publication was in a newspaper."
LoRD DENMAN, C. J. "However large the privilege of electors may
be, it is extravagant to suppose that it can justify the publication to
all the world of facts injurious to a person who happens to stand in
the situation of a candidate." The motion for a new trial was de-
nied. We do not regard this case as an authority upon the question
whether a charge against the private character of a candidate is, or
is not, prima facie protected; but only as deciding that such condi-
tional privilege, if it be assumed to have existed, is defeated by the
giving of excessive publicity to the charge.
5 9
In two later cases, upon a trial before a single judge, charges
against a candidate for an elective office were held entitled to con-
ditional privilege; subject, of course, to be defeated by proof of
express malice (wrong motive) on the part of the defendant. Wis-
dom v. Brown, I885, I Times L. R. 412; Pankhurst v. Hamilton,
1887, 3 Times L. R. 5oo. In the first case the plaintiff was a candi-
date for election as church warden; and the charge was that he had
been a bankrupt. In the second case, the plaintiff was candidate for
Parliament, and the charge was that he said that there was no God;
an. assertion which involved the indictable offence of blasphemy.
60
There is a still more recent case in the Cotlrt of Appeal.
0 ' Plain-
tiff had been a member of a -vestry; now converted into a borough
council. He was now a candidate for mayor of the borough; and
was charged by defendant with having, previously received a bribe
to influence his action as vestryman. The defendant, in his answer,
set up the defence that the words were uttered on a privileged occas-
ion, bona fide, without malice, and in discharge of duty. This an-
swer was not demurred to; The question before the court was,
whether the plaintiff should be allowed to put an interrogatory to
9 Mr. Odgers would seem to have understood Lord Denman's charge to the jury
as asserting that a charge against the private character of a candidate was not 
entitled
to conditional privilege. But Mr. Odgers evidently dissents from this view, saying, 
"It
is submitted, however, that the electors are entitled to investigate all matters in the past
private life of a candidate which, if true, would prove him morally or intellectually
knfit to represent them in Parliament; but not to state as facts what they only know
as rumours." Odgers, Libel and Slander, Sth Ed. 2o8. But compare, p. 284.
" See also Cocy :RN, C. J., in George v. Goddard, x861, 2 Fost. & Fini. 689, 69o.
61 Elliott v. Garrett, L. R. (1902), IC. KB. 87o.
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the defendant, "aimed at enabling the plaintiff to prove that which,
if proved, would be an answer to the plea of privilege, namely that
the statement was malicious." (See VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L. J., p.
872). The interrogatory was allowed. It w;s taken for granted
that the occasion was pri nd facie privileged; and that the defence
of privilege must prevail unless the plaintiff defeated it by proving
express malice (wrong motive).
In view of these more recent cases, we regard the English law as
holding that conditional privilege attaches to charges against a can-
didate for an elective office; including not only charges as to mis-
conduct in public office; but also charges as to matters in the candi-
date's private life which, if true, would prove him unfit to hold the
office in question.
We have said, ante, that conditional privilege may be defeated by
giving unreasonable publicity to the communication; and we con-
sider this a substantive defence, not important merely so far as it
affords evidence of "express malice" (wrong motive).
Suppose that an attack upon the character of a candidate for an
elective office is published in a newspaper whose circulation is not
confined to the election district. Does the publication in the news-
paper necessarily and always destroy the prins facfe protection? 2
To this general question we should give a negative answer.
The reasonableness of publishing in a fiewspaper would seem to
depend upon a comparison, of (i) the efficacy of this mode of reach-
ing the voters in the election district, and (2) the extent to which
the charge would thus become known to persons residing outside the
district.
Of course, it is easy to imagine cases where publication in a news-
paper would not be a reasonable method. Suppose that plaintiff is a
candidate for County Treasurer in Aroostook County, Maine, that
defendant inserts in the New York Daily Tribune a charge that
plaintiff has been guilty of embezzlement, and that only two voters
" As to a case where a third person's knowledge of a communication is not derived
through the medium of a newspaper:
The simple circumstance that a communication was made in the presence of a third
person, or in such a way as to make it probable that it would be read by a third person,
"does by no means of necessity take away from it the protection which the law would
otherwise afford." The mere fact of an outsider being present may be a circumstance
to be considered by the jury in paising upon the question of wrong motive, but it "does
not, of itsel." destroy the prima facie protection. PsixE, B., in Toogood v. Spyrina
1834, x C. M. & IL iSf, p. x94.
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in Aroostook County are habitual readers of the New York Daily
Tribune. Defendant has abused his conditional privilege.
But how if defendant inserts this charge in a newspaper which 
is
published and chiefly circulated in Aroostook County? Is his prime
facie privilege forfeited by proof that the newspaper has some read-
ers outside of that county? There are cases which would seem to
answer this question in the affirmative.6
But we think that this answer is wrong."
If there is fair ground for doubt, the question of reasonableness
should be submitted to the jury. See Hatch v. Lane, I87O, 1O5 Mass.
394. Various authorities are collected in a note in 20 L. R. 
A.
(N. S.) 361. See also Walters v. Sentinel Co., Wisconsin, 1918; 169
Northwestern Reporter, 564.
The foregoing relates to candidates to be voted for at a general
election; not where an office is to be filled by an appointment to be
made by a single official or by a board.
5
It has been held that communication- to the appointing power,
"with reference to the character and qualifications of a candidate for.
an appointment, are conditionally privileged, and that no action will
lie unless the communication is both false and malicious." 33. Am. &
Eng. Ann Cas., 1914 C, note p. ioo2.
Does the same rule (whatever it may be) that prevails as to the
allowance of conditional privilege in case of defamatory charges
against the character, of a candidate for an elective office, apply to
charges of official misconduct made against a public official, who is
not a candidate, either for re-election, or for election to any public
office whatever?"
It has been said by excellent authority that the law of defamation
is the same in the two cases.
67 But we think that some distinctions
must be made as to charges against public officials; that some of those
charges may be conditionally privileged, while others are not; and
See State v. Haskins, 1899, 109 Iowa, 66; S. C., 47 L. R. Ann. 223; 
77 Am. St.
Rep. s6o; also some of the cases cited in r Ames and Smith's Cases on 
Torts, Edition of
1910, S39, note 3.
" See Cqleman v. McLennan, 78 Kan. i9o8, 711, 743; S. C., 2o L. R. 
Ann. New
Series, 361.
"See 33 Am. & Eng. Annotated Cases, 19T4, C, note p. 1oo2; citing 
Hunt v. Ben-
nett, t859, i9 N. Y. 173; Knapp v. Campbel, 1896, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 
x99.
ee'"We are not now considering the law as to the right to comment 
pn proved or
admitted conduct of a public officer; as to which see Odgers on Libel 
and Slander, Sth
ed. 207-2o8. Here we are dealing only with direct charges of acts of misconduct; 
which
turn out to be unfounded.
"T FOLGER, C. J., 8r N. Y., p. 116.
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,that the allowance of prima facie protection in some cases may de-
pend on conditions which are not generally material in charges
against candidates.
Charges against candidates are generally understood to be ad-
dressed to the body of electors, with the alleged motive of giving
them information to guide their choice, and with the alleged inten-
tion of bringing about the defeat of unsuitable candidates.
But as concerns charges of official misconduct against public
officers; there are material differences as to the persons to whom
the charges are addressed, and also as to the purposes sought to be
accomplished.
At one extreme stands the case of charges addressed to high
public officials or public authorities whose legal duty it is to investi-
gate the charges, and who have power to remove or punish an offend-
ing official, or to make orders and regulations which will prevent a
repetition of the offense; and who are now asked to exert their
powers. In such cases the occasion confers conditional privilege on
the maker of the charges. He is exonerated if the charges were
made with a reasonable belief in their truth, and with a bona fide
purpose to benefit the community by inducing the authorities to
exert their powers.6 s
At the other extreme, stand the cases where the charges are not
addressed to any officials having special powers to investigate or
take action thereon; but are thrown out at random without the
motive or intent of serving the public interest, and are published
simply to make a newspaper salable.69 Here it cannot be said that
the charges are conditionally privileged.
Between these extremes, there is a third class of cases; as to
a See Odgers, Libel and Slander, 5th ed. a77, and examples 277-279; Rower, Code
etc., p. 128 and note g. Croucher v. tngUr. z889, z6 Scotch Session Cases, Fourth Series,
774. Sweeney v. Higgins, Mainte, 1918, 204 AtL 791.
"An action on the case for a libel lies against a party making a communicaion in
writing to the head of a department of the government charging a subordinate officer
of such department with peculoiioa and fraud of various kinds, where such subordinate
officer is subject to removal by the officer to whom the communication is addressed; but
such action, 'though in form for a libel is in the nature of an ,action for a mlicious
prosecution, and the proof to sustain it must be the same as is required in the latter
action, i. e., the plaintiff is bound to. show both malice and a want of probable cause-"
First headnote in Howard v. Thompson, 1839, 21 Wend. N. Y. 319; where there is
an elaborate opinion by CowEN, J.
Charges preferred to a lodge of Odd- Fellows, by one member against another,
where the lodge under its rules has a right to investigate and remedy, are privileged.
To maintain an action for making them, it must he shown affirmatively that they were
made both maliciously and without probable cause. Streety v. Wood, 1853, IS Barbour zo$.
. Defendants are not likely to admit this state of things; but a jury might not un-
frequently be justified in finding that it existed.'
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which there is likely to be a conflict of authority so. far as 
concerns
the allowance of conditional privilege. This class comprises charges
of official misconduct, not specifically addressed to any public auth-
orities having power to take action thereort; but put forth with 
the
purpose of serving the public interest by making existing 
abuses
known so that citizens may use their influence to bring about reforms.
Personally I should be inclined to hold that charges made 
under
these circumstances were conditionally privileged.
7 0 But there are
various decisions which support the contrary view.
1
Does conditional privilege attach to charges made against an office
holder, for the purpose of (I) discrediting, and preventing the 
re-
election of, the Governor who appointed him, or (2) discrediting the
party by whom he was nominated and elected?
As to (I), held contra in Maryland; Coffin v. Brown, i9Ol, 
94
Maryland 19o, Box-D J. 195-198.
As to "comment" in relation to the conduct and acts of candidates
for office:
Most of the questions respecting the right of comment upon 
ad-
mitted or proved acts of a plaintiff will not be discussed 
in this
paper. The present discussion as to comment will be confined 
to one
question, upon which there is a conflict of authority, viz. Whether,
under the right of comment upon proved or admitted facts, improper
motives (involving bad character) may be imputed to a candidate.
England, in recent decisions, says Yes: provided the wrong mo-
tives may fairly be inferrect from the cohduct or acts of the 
can-
didate.7 2
The United States, by the weight of dicta, says: No: not even
though the existence of wrong motive was a reasonable inference
from the facts proved or admitted.Ja
"See Palmer v. Concord, i868, 48 N. H. 211.
n In a note in 2 Boblen's Cases on Torts, p. 1073, note 3, 
the learned editor says:
"Many courts allows a wide latitude in publishing to 
the public the official misconduct
of public officers * * * or the misconduct of public affairs 
if published for the purpose
of inducing citizens to use their influence to have the abuse remedied 
"
He then cites authorities pro and con.
As tending to support such publications, see Palmer v. Concord, 
1868, 48 N. IL six;
and instructions to the jury in O'Rourke v. Lewiston & Co., x896, 
89 Maine, 3xo. Among
authorities tending contra, see Foster v. Scripps:, 1878, 39 Mich. 376, 381-384; 
Hamilton
v. Eno, x88o, 81 N. Y. xx6.
12"A personal attack may form part of a fair comment 
upon given facts truly stated
if it be warranted by those facts-in other words, in my 
view, if it be a reasonable infer-
ence from those facts." Loi ArximsoM, in Dakhyl v. Labouchrtr, 
House of Lords,
reported in note, L. R. (r9o8) 2 K. B. p. 325-330.
IsThat most American expressions of judicial opinion to the above effect are nothing
more than dicta, see judge Veeder, in 23 Hary. Law Rev., 
p. 432.
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The prevailing United States view seems to rest upon one of two
assumptions.
I. That bad private character does not affect fitness for public
office.
This view is already sufficiently refuted in an earlier part of this
paper.
2. That an inference of wrong motive can never be fastly drawn
from acts or conduct.
This is contrary to general experience, and is opposed to the rul-
ings of courts in other classes of cases.
"This doctrine, so far as it is intelligible, would seem to leave
little, if any, more practical freedom in the discussion of matters of
public interest than that which is permitted in the discussion of the
conduct of a private person. It leaves the law very much in the
attitude of saying, 'You have full liberty of discussion, provided,
however, you say nothing that counts."'-74
The view taken in the recent English cases seems so clearly cor-
rect that one wonders how the opposite view, often expressed by
American judges, eyer came- to be entertained.
One reason is found in the fact that the early questions before
the courts upon the right of comment arose chiefly upon books and
works of art. Here the character of the author or artist was im-
material. The only subject for criticism related to the intrinsic
merits of the work.
. Another reason is found in the disfavor with which courts were
formerly accustomed to look upon attacks upon public men, because
such attacks Were supposed to have a tendency to overturn the ex-
isting form of government. 5
This question-whether under the right of comment upon proved
or admitted facts, improper motives (involving bad character) may
be imputed to a candidate-is ably discussed by Professor Chase
in 23 Am. Law Rev. 352-53, 368, 369; and by Judge Veeder in 23
Harv. Law Rev. 413, et seq.
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"Judge Veeder, 23 Harv. Law Rev. 434.
"See Odgers, Outline of Law of Libel, ig!"-x97.
